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Summary
The United Nations Mission in Eastern Chad and the Central African Republic 
(MINURCAT) was established to protect civilians and contribute to rule of law 
and regional peace in the conflict-prone region bordering Darfur. The mission was 
dismantled towards the end of 2010. This report, based on fieldwork undertaken in 
Chad in 2009, addresses the situation of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) 
against refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) in eastern Chad and difficul-
ties MINURCAT encountered in its response to such violence. 
Many of the SGBV cases are reported being committed when women leave camps and 
sites to fetch firewood, water etc. However, many of the reported cases are also com-
mitted inside the camps and sites by family members, neighbours etc. An important 
part of the combat against SGBV has thus been to sensitize the targeted population 
on harmful customs and human rights violations. This has been especially important 
for the various gender and women committees in the refugee camps. 
A major objective throughout the mission has been to establish a national community 
policing, which eventually came into being in 2008 under the name of the Détachement 
intégré de sécurité (DIS). The DIS is maintaining the rule of law in the refugee camps, 
IDP sites and key towns within a 10 km radius. The staff has been gender-trained 
and all of the units have a gender focal point. Throughout the field visit, however, it 
was argued that the important work of DIS was being hampered by a dysfunctioning 
judicial system. Furthermore, victims of SGBV who report their cases to the DIS are 
vulnerable to reprisals. All aspects of community policing had not been addressed 
within DIS. The only aspect that had been addressed was gender, with the consequence 
that the gender office carried out most of the community policing. The gender units 
within DIS seemed to function.
Overall, in staunch contrast to the picture portrayed to us by a number of reports which 
were published just before our fieldwork, we were given the impression by most of 
those interviewed that the security of refugees and IDPs was much better than what 
it had been before the arrival of EUFOR and MINURCAT.
The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Progrmme (TfP) www.trainingforpeace.org

Introduction 
The enduring conflict in Darfur has received extensive international 
attention. However, the conflicts and political crisis in neighbouring 
Chad have gone largely unnoticed, or have simply been referred to as 
a spill-over effect of the Darfuri conflict. Since 2005, however, it be-
came largely evident that the governments of Sudan and Chad were 
fighting proxy wars and backing opposing rebel groups in each other’s 
countries. As a consequence of the fighting, refugees from Darfur 
have sought protection in neighbouring Chad and the internal turmoil 
in Chad has caused an increase in the number of internally displaced 
people (IDPs). Though fighting has diminished today, the high num-
ber of refugees, IDPs and bandit groups, together with the prolifera-
tion of arms, continues to pose great security risks. 
 
This report addresses the current situation of sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) against refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad. But in 
war and conflict situations, addressing SGBV is both a matter of secu-
rity politics and an important part of the humanitarian imperative to 
protect civilians under the auspices of international humanitarian law 
and international human rights. In June 2008, the United Nation Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1820. The 
resolution stated that ‘rape and other forms of sexual violence can 
constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act 
with respect to genocide’ and is aimed at ending sexual violence in 
conflict. Military discipline, responsibility and training are cited as 
central elements for accomplishing the goals of 1820. As a follow-up 
of the resolution, the UNSC in 2009 adopted Resolutions 1888, on 
sexual violence in war and conflict, and 1889, on violence against 
women and girls.   
 
These resolutions are a result of a much broader agenda to mainstream 
gender perspectives at all levels of the UN peacekeeping and peace-
building operations and peace negations since the adoption of UNSC 
Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. Resolution 
1325 has received widespread popular support from women’s activist 
groups and donor countries in order to strengthen equal rights for 
women to live in peace and security. A key goal in the resolution is to 
empower women in decision-making positions at all levels and to con-
tribute in conflict resolution and peace processes. Nevertheless, actual 
implementation has proven difficult and much of the effort has taken 
place at the advocacy level and only to a lesser extent at the opera-
tional level.  
 
After offering a brief overview of research procedure and background, 
we situate the MINURCAT operation in the context of the current po-
litical processes and humanitarian situation in Chad and the Darfur 
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Region, before turning to the main findings from our fieldwork. Over-
all, we argue that MINURCAT seemed to have been fairly successful 
– especially taken into account its dramatically low deployment com-
pared to its authorized mandate – in securing areas around refugee 
camps and some IDP camps. This stands in strong contrast to the pic-
ture portrayed by advocacy groups only months prior to our fieldwork. 
Research Procedure 
The data supporting the findings in this report are based on a 10-day 
field visit to Chad in November 2009, covering the capital N’Djamena 
and eastern Chad, including Abéché, Goz Beida, Farchana and 
Guéréda, as well as on a previous field visit in March 2009. Informa-
tion has been acquired from formal interviews and informal discus-
sions. These included interviews and discussions with key 
MINURCAT and other UN personnel, including the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSG, 
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), Chadian police, refugees 
and internally displaced men and women. During discussions with 
IDPs and refugees, the team divided into two separate groups so that 
the female researcher spoke with women and the male researchers 
with men. Central to the field visit was to capture the positions of both 
the central decision-makers and the realities and practice on the 
ground in eastern Chad. This was made possible by the logistical fa-
cilitation provided by MINURCAT, as Chad has no public infrastruc-
ture and is largely an impassable country. For the purpose of protect-
ing informants’ security, their names are withheld.  
 
Additional data and background information have been gathered from 
desk surveys of available reports and literature. These include both 
academic literature and blog posts1 as well as policy/advocacy litera-
ture. It should be noted that background literature on Chad remains 
scarce, as goes for advocacy literature which often is more focused on 
Darfur and ‘the spill-over effect’ in eastern Chad.  
Chad and the Protection of Vulnerable Groups 
Today, there are approximately 240 000 refugees from Darfur, around 
180 000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 45 000 from the Cen-
tral African Republic (CAR) in Chad.2 As already noted, it is widely 
recognized that the conflicts in Northern Sudan and Chad are closely 
related and that any viable peace in Darfur is dependent on a peace 
agreement between the governments of Khartoum and N’Djamena (de 
                                                 
1  “Making sense of Darfur” is a blog post under the Social Science Research Council (New 
York) found at http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/.  
2  Statistics provided by the MINURCAT official webpage.  
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Waal, 2009). This is most obvious since both of the governments are 
backing military oppositions in each other’s countries, but there are 
also several other underlying and less visible issues in Chad affecting 
peace and security between and within the two countries. For one, 
while there are international efforts to reach a peace settlement in Dar-
fur, there are no such parallel processes in Chad (Enough, 2009). This 
may, for instance, be due to that short-term humanitarian efforts with-
out any internationally supported political processes in Chad can 
cause long-term displacement as well as unintentional support of 
armed elements. The ability to protect in Chad, a UN officer told us, 
had to be worked out with reference to the situation in Libya, Camer-
oon, but especially Sudan and the Central African Republic. A solu-
tion to the violence in the Darfur region could not be worked out 
through “national” UN missions, but required a regional approach (In-
terview N’Djamena, 2 November 2009). The protection efforts of the 
international community and MINURCAT were not made easier by 
the sheer size of the country. The lack of communications, infrastruc-
ture and the difficulty to run national campaigns of prevention led to 
the fragmentation of actions.  
 
Furthermore, Chadian president Idriss Déby and his government have 
had a tendency to use military confrontation or buy off rebel groups, 
hand in hand with a seemingly never-ending military build-up of the 
security forces, according to the Enough report (2009). As most of the 
government’s power is concentrated in the capital, they lack the abil-
ity to control the entire Chadian territory. In the words of de Wall 
(2009), “control of state power in Chad is all-or-nothing and is inti-
mately and intricately linked to the political position of the [ethnic 
group] Zaghawa, who are a small minority with disproportionate 
power and wealth”.3  
 
Henceforth, the presence of militias, rebel groups and bandit groups 
unsurprisingly creates instability and insecurity for the population in 
eastern Chad, and it also poses great challenges for the operational 
environment and humanitarian space for the international and local 
personnel. The infamous militia group Janjaweed from Western Sudan 
present in eastern Chad is an umbrella term for the armed Darfuri 
groups that have received training and equipment from the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (Haggar, 2007:113). The domestic rebel groups share at 
the very least the common feature of an ‘anti-Déby ideology’, but alli-
ances are fluid and marked by divisions and rivalries (Seibert, 
2007:12). During the political turmoil in Chad in 2005, many key 
members of the government chose to join and support the rebellion 
against Déby (Giroux et al., 2009:4). This has caused a proliferation in 
                                                 
3  Blog post, 31 July 2009. http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2009/07/31/good-enough-report-on-
chad/  
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the number of rebel groups currently present in eastern Chad. In addi-
tion, there are increasingly problems concerning bandit groups in the 
area, encouraged by the availability of vehicles and money in the re-
gion due to the relatively large international presence. To take one ex-
ample from Guéréda, in north-eastern Chad close to the boarder of 
Darfur, humanitarian workers can only move about with police escort 
and must store their cars in police compounds after dark. This is a re-
sult of weekly armed attacks and theft of vehicles, which in turn cur-
tail the humanitarian workers’ activities. Furthermore, several of the 
humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and other 
non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), such as Médecins sans 
frontieres (MSF) and Solidarités, have fallen victim of kidnapping and 
killings of their staff (see e.g. UNSC, 2009d:3). In sum, the operating 
environment is a major challenge in eastern Chad.  
 
The bandit groups are also a result of the influx of international hu-
manitarian staff in local societies and towns, such as Abéché, the 
headquarters of the UN. For instance, in Abéché the water system was 
ill-prepared for the arrival of aid workers and peacekeepers and their 
much more wasteful consumption compared to that of the host com-
munities (IRIN news, 27.1.10). In addition, housing and food costs in 
Abéché reach levels often beyond what the vulnerable residents can 
afford. This has in turn resulted in incidents where locals have been 
cheering and supporting carjacking to hamper operations.   
 
In terms of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), reports from 
Amnesty International (e.g. 2006 and 2009) emphasize the use of rape 
as a weapon of war against Darfur refugees in eastern Chad, allegedly 
perpetrated by Janjaweed militias. These attacks are often carried out 
when women leave the camps to gather firewood, fetch water or find 
food for their cattle. In many of the camps we were told that the only 
income-generating activity in and around the camp for women was to 
collect firewood, which could then be sold. But as the camps had be-
come more established, less and less firewood was available in the 
surroundings of the camps. In Djabal, for instance, we were told that 
the available firewood was too far away from the camp now – about 
20 km – and that one needed a donkey or a horse. This in turn was an 
additional risk, as it could easily attract attention and risk being stolen 
(Interviews in Djabal refugee camp, 3 November 2009). 
 
A number of reports address the level of domestic violence within the 
refugee camps, committed by neighbours, husbands or other family 
members. Furthermore, the reports call attention to ‘a culture of impu-
nity’ of violence against women and girls in eastern Chad. It is argued 
that the Chadian legal framework remains weak, that there is lack of 
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sufficient judicial personnel and meagre political will among local 
Chadian authorities to deal with SGBV cases (Amnesty International, 
2009:4). Instead of formal legal structures, cases of rape and other 
forms of SGBV are more often dealt with in traditional dispute resolu-
tions and negotiated settlements, according to Amnesty. In the Far-
chana refugee camp, we were told that domestic violence was gener-
ally settled outside the courts (“à l’amiable”) in accordance with tradi-
tional customs. A UN worker in Farchana told us that while rape did 
occur, it was seldom reported; especially in polygamous households. 
The reason for this was that rape and bastonnade were often seen by 
the community as occurring as a consequence of a woman’s “refusal 
to entertain her husband”. It is a duty on the part of the woman to en-
tertain her husband, we were told by a Chadian NGO worker. If she 
complains, the community may blame the woman for refusing to ac-
commodate her husband’s needs (Farchana refugee camp, 4 Novem-
ber 2009). Speaking with the UNHCR, we were also told that the aid 
provided in the camps could sometimes create social problems. For 
instance, dumping one’s first wife and taking on a new – “referred to 
in the meeting as “wife dumping”) – was more common in sites than 
in the population, as the first wife would still receive food and be pro-
vided for (Abéché, 6 November 2009).  
 
In a report by Physicians for Human Rights (2009:21), the second 
most reported worry in the daily life of Darfuri women in Chadian 
refugee camps in Farchana was the concern for their safety and sexual 
violence4 (46,7%), after food insecurity (58,9%). According to their 
findings, rape cases were not reported since, as the Darfuri women 
argued, nothing would be done about it anyway. In their conclusion 
(p. 26) “the women (…) preferred to suffer in silence, since the risk of 
reporting outweighed any possible potential benefit”. The women also 
told them that they were fearful of attacks by people from the host 
communities. In Farchana we were also told that the rate of violence 
had gone down as a result of a number of joint projects initiated for 
the refugees and the local population. For almost a year, we were told, 
not a single case of rape had been registered. This contrasted with up 
to 2-3 rapes a month between 2006 and 2007.  
 
The resource scarcity in eastern Chad, combined with the influx of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees from Darfur, can understandably 
create a hostile environment. As one woman stated (p. 28): “The 
Chadian people don’t like us. They yell at us and tell us not to take 
their wood.” In conclusion, the SGBV attacks, according to these re-
ports, mostly take place in connection with disputes between host 
communities and refugees over food, water and firewood. The as-
                                                 
4  A methodological concern here, however, is the grouping of ‘safety and sexual violence’, 
as safety in general is an encompassing concern.  
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sessment of the security situation we were given by site and camp rep-
resentatives was largely echoed by NGO workers we interviewed. The 
security was good within the camps, but it was “not the same” outside 
of them. In fact, we were told that the issue outside the camps was 
now less a matter of individual security – such as regarding rape – and 
more one of “area security.” However, as it was stressed to us on a 
number of occasions, it was difficult to aggregate the numbers, as 
many cases go unreported in some sites or camps (Interviews with a 
group of NGOs, Goz Beida 3 November 2009) In Farchana, the camp 
elders complained that the security situation for women outside the 
camps was reminiscent of the situation they had fled from.  
 
When talking about the security of camps and sites, the role of the 
Chadian army seemed to be crucial. Troop movements, we were told, 
had a “massive impact” on the security of the sites, causing a host of 
security and protection problems. Their bringing weapons into the 
sites as well as the ongoing recruitment of children were indicative of 
their lack of respect for the civilian and humanitarian character of the 
camps. A large military presence automatically led to violence, we 
were told (Interviews with a group of NGOS, Goz Beida, 3 November 
2009). 
MINURCAT and EUFOR in a Challenging Environment 
As a response to the considerable number of refugees from the 
neighbouring countries and IDPs in Chad, the Security Council 
adopted resolution 1778 in September 2007 to authorize the deploy-
ment of a UN civilian and police operation named MINURCAT, and a 
European Union military force (EUFOR Chad/RCA). The mandate of 
the mission was and continues to be the establishment of “security 
conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of 
refugees and displaced persons, inter alia by contributing to the pro-
tection of refugees, displaced persons and civilians in danger, by fa-
cilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and 
the north-eastern Central African Republic and by creating favourable 
conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social develop-
ment of those areas”.5  But one of the problems of the MINURCAT 
mission, as we were told repeatedly by the mission itself, was the fact 
that MINURCAT was but a contribution to the protection efforts in 
eastern Chad. En route we encountered many views on the effective-
ness of MINURCAT. While an NGO worker told us angrily that 
“MINURCAT, c’est un désastre”, a DIS commissioner told us 
“MINURCAT est un moteur diesel, qui roule doucement. Mais quand 
ça prend, ça prend...” But while the security of the camps was good 
with the deployment of MINURCAT, NGO workers complained 
                                                 
5  UN Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007) 
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about the fact that it was easier to attend to sites further away from 
Farchana with the EUFOR presence. The chronic understaffing and 
lack of equipment of MINURCAT were again the problem.  
 
The EUFOR was deployed as a support for the MINURCAT mission 
for the protection of refugees and IDPs and for the security of UN and 
humanitarian personnel, while the UN was preparing for deploying a 
military component. The EUFOR was the largest EU military opera-
tion ever deployed in Africa. In March 2009, EUFOR transferred its 
authority to the UN military component of MINURCAT. This was 
done in accordance with the UNSC Resolution 1861 (2009) authoriz-
ing a renewed mandate for MINURCAT. However, only 52% of the 
force authorized by the resolution (5225 military personnel) have been 
deployed (UN SC, 2009d:5). This was felt by many as one of the main 
difficulties in delivering the mandate. It was especially difficult with 
respect to creating the secure environment necessary for the civilian 
part of the mission to play its role (Interview with UN staff, 2 Novem-
ber 2009). And while the security in and around the camps may be 
improving, it is difficult to assess with certainty. The result is a lot of 
rumours circulating inside the camps, with people often afraid to leave 
the camps. For instance, in some camps we were told about refugees 
or IDPs who had been killed when returning home. As a result, few 
were willing to risk returning, in spite of the situation having become 
better.  
 
The gender unit in MINURCAT was established in May 2008 with its 
head office in Abéché and a liaison office in N’Djamena.6 The main 
objectives of the unit are to (1) put in practice resolutions 1325 and 
1820, (2) inform MINURCAT personnel on gender issues, and (3) 
mainstream gender activities in the mission. One of their main priori-
ties has been to strengthen the capacity of the Détachement intégré de 
sécurité (DIS) to protect women and children, as will be returned to 
below. The first lady in Chad, Hinda Deby Itno, has taken a lead role 
in supporting the gender unit and its campaigns, in particular as to the 
fight against SGBV. A political will from the highest level of the 
Chadian government is seen as crucial, especially since the first lady 
has received much popular support in Chad (see e.g. Wax 2006).  Fur-
thermore, UNFPA and partners in the gender cluster have worked to 
develop a referral system on SGBV cases, so that response procedures 
are harmonized and standardized within the judicial, security, medical 
and psychosocial sectors.  
 
An integral part of the MINURCAT mission is the establishment of 
the Chadian police, DIS, as mentioned above. Since the military ca-
pacity in MINURCAT is only at 52% of its nominal level, DIS are 
                                                 
6  MINURCAT Briefing Note Gender Unit.  
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conducting much of the escort measures. They are deployed in order 
to maintain law and order in refugee camps, IDP sites and key towns 
in neighbouring areas within a 10 km radius, as well as securing hu-
manitarian activities in eastern Chad.7 It is a mixed police force, con-
sisting of more than 850 both Chadian police and gendarme officers. 
One of the main objectives with the DIS is to increase the number of 
women in the force to achieve a more gender-balanced approach to 
policing in Chad. As of 9 November, the force consisted of 11,5% fe-
male officers. However, few of the women have a leadership position 
within the units and a majority of the women occupy a position as 
gender focal points (ibid.). It should be noted that Chad is generally a 
male dominated culture and there are several examples of male resis-
tance to women leadership and harassment of female personnel. Fur-
thermore, the highly qualified and educated women are, generally 
speaking, less attracted to police jobs. Nevertheless, the female offi-
cers in the DIS represent a positive start and have made significant 
contributions to reach other women.  
Protection and SGBV 
Throughout the field visit, it became evident that SGBV was high on 
the agenda and constituted a cross-cutting issue in various operational 
sections of MINURCAT and UN departments, such as the human 
rights section, the gender unit and the rule of law unit. UNHCR pro-
duces monthly reports on SGBV cases in all of the refugee camps in 
Chad. The cases are tracked in order to systematize the incidents and 
enhance the understanding of when and where SGBV takes place. 
Since the onset of this type of recording and tracking in January 2009 
and up until 31 August 2009, the UNHCR has reported a total of 439 
SGBV cases, including 23 cases of rape and 25 rape attempts. 
UNHCR found that all the cases of rape outside of camps were alleg-
edly committed by Chadians (except for one case committed by a 
refugee), while all the cases inside the camps, except one, were com-
mitted by refugees (family members, neighbours etc). UNHCR staff 
found that a high number of the cases outside of the camps was com-
mitted when women were out to gather firewood, usually on a dis-
tance of 20 to 30 km away from the camps, i.e. beyond the operational 
field of the DIS. Due to the sensitivity and stigma attached to this 
form of violence, however, there is reason to believe that there re-
mains a certain amount of unreported cases. In addition, when cases of 
rape are reported, only a few victims are willing to pursue their cases 
in the formal legal system, if this system even exists, while the rest 
seeks traditional justice compensation. 
 
                                                 
7  MINURCAT Police presentation in N’Djamena, Chad, 29 October 2009.  
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In the Koloma site we were made aware of the need to avoid generic 
notions of women’s rights and needs. As we were told, there was a 
need to distinguish between women who had a husband and those who 
did not. Those who had a husband, we were told by the representa-
tives, were doing ok, while those who had lost their husbands were in 
a difficult situation. In order to subsist, they had to gather stones and 
straw to sell in the town nearby. Leaving the site was however a risk 
to take. But this distinction did not only apply to women. As we were 
told, the same problems applied to older men.  
 
The reason for many problems in the camps, we were told, was tradi-
tion, but also poverty. Many rapes were caused by the difficult eco-
nomic situation of women, who often were abused by their husbands. 
A very effective means of protecting vulnerable women against do-
mestic abuse was helping women out of poverty. But too few pro-
grammes addressed this type of activity, a UNHCR worker told us 
(Farchana refugee camp, 4 November 2009). 
 
It was widely agreed that the security in the camps has improved, al-
though problems between camps and towns somehow seemed to have 
persisted. These seemed to range from acts of violence to the fact that 
refugees or IDPs were stigmatized and made fun of in the towns. In 
Gouroukoun, the camp leaders told us that they were being made fun 
of in the town, people shouting “no one wants you, you’ve been re-
jected”. (Interviews in Gouroukoun IDP camp, 3 November 2009). 
Since many of the SGBV attacks take place as women leave the 
camps to gather firewood, there have been several efforts by UNHCR 
and others to reduce this risk by (1) having firewood posts within the 
camp areas, (2) introduce solar cookers for more sustainable and effi-
cient energy use and (3) encourage men to participate in firewood 
gathering. The high consumption of firewood in the region, however, 
poses risks of increased conflicts with host communities as well as 
environmental challenges. Further, the men were generally reluctant to 
accompany the women as this was not perceived as a traditional male 
role. The solar cookers, on the other hand, have proven to be of low 
standard and there is a need to improve both financial support and the 
quality of such equipment. There is evidently large potential to im-
prove and facilitate for solar technology in an area with a daily aver-
age of 8,6 hours of sun.8 Since tension between refugees and host 
communities as well as within the camps is often rooted in livelihood 
shortages, such investments could not only improve living conditions 
and contribute to a more sustainable development but also indirectly 
have an effect on the level of violence.  
 
                                                 
8  Climate in Chad: http://www.worldtravelguide.net/country/55/climate/Africa/Chad.html  
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There was however widespread agreement that the security of the 
camps had become better with DIS. However, representatives in most 
camps agreed that there should be more patrols. But on the whole, the 
feedback we got was positive. While camps previously had to rely on 
the military, the presence of trained police seemed to have improved 
the situation (Interviews in Gouroukoun IDP camp, 3 November 
2009).  
Taking Local Ownership?  
Most of the cases reported by UNHCR were detected through the 
SGBV-related ‘committees’ in the camps, which include ‘SGBV vic-
tims committee’, ‘women committee’ and the ‘leaders committee’. 
However, in some camps we were told that one of the most pressing 
issues was to get accurate information as to the scope of SGBV. And 
while many crimes went unreported, there seemed to be an established 
understanding among Chadian police officers, UN staff and agency 
workers we interviewed that rape was not a widespread problem, al-
though some alarming reports had been circulating (Interview with 
UN Police, 3 November 2009). The research team met and discussed 
with some of these groups during the field visit in the refugee camps. 
These committees serve many different purposes, for instance dispute 
resolutions between refugees and sensitization among the refugees 
concerning domestic violence against women. The advocacy literature 
has portrayed a rather dramatic picture of sexual violence as a weapon 
of war in eastern Chad committed by armed groups like the Jan-
jaweed. More often, however, harmful traditions such as early mar-
riages (11-12 years) and female circumcision (FGM), and various 
forms of domestic violence against women and girls are the most fre-
quent reported cases of SGBV. Our informants in the committees 
stated that the committees and supporting networks have played a cru-
cial role in sensitization on SGBV. While incidents still went unre-
ported, NGO workers in the camps told us that the situation was better 
now than before. A comité de vigilance had been formed in the camp, 
acting as a link between the refugees, NGO partners and the UNHCR 
and reporting cases that had become violent.  
 
They argued that they had not previously, i.e. before they arrived as 
refugees in Chad, discussed or reflected on their customs and tradi-
tions. As one stated, sensitivity programmes make it possible for peo-
ple to understand that their rights are being violated. They argued that 
a lot of the human rights violations were justified through religious 
practice and customs. Through gender sensitivity training in the com-
mittees, they had become aware of that a lot of their problems were 
related to SGBV.  
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On the whole, we were told in Mile, SGBV had gone down compared 
to the early years when the refugees had first arrived: “When sensi-
tized to SGBV we realized that much of what was happening was not 
custom but actually SGBV crimes.” Another woman explained: “In 
the beginning, in Darfur, we didn’t understand SGBV. We didn’t un-
derstand anything. In Darfur we thought that men could do anything. 
Women didn’t understand anything. Now, women understand that if 
they are beaten etc. they can report it to DIS who can convoque the 
person, and treat it through the committee of sheikhs, and if that 
doesn’t work, refer it to Guéréda [the nearest Préfecture]. We now 
know that we can defend ourselves.” “You could give us millions and 
make us rich,” another woman told us, “but only knowledge remains 
forever.” The SGBV committee also emphasized that they would 
teach their knowledge of the harmful traditions when back in Darfur, 
but envisioned a problem in terms of what authority they would have 
coming back to Darfur and preaching: they had not received any di-
plomas for their training. This had already proved to be difficult in 
some cases where families had asked to see the credentials of the 
SGBV officers, and rejected their help as they had been unable to 
show a diploma of their SGBV qualification.” (Mile Camp SGBV 
Committee, 5 November 2009) This contrasted with what we were 
told by a UNHCR officer a few days later: Is the problem tradition, 
lack of education? People don’t even realize that their rights are being 
violated.” (Abéché, 6 November 2009). 
 
Furthermore, as one in the gender committee in a camp in Guéréda 
stated (5 November 2009), though women do not have any education 
(including human rights knowledge), they can without doubt under-
stand and detect security concerns. Hence, these forums for discussing 
their concerns with committees can facilitate for taking their security 
challenges to the DIS and UNHCR. In sum, such committees appeared 
to have played an important role in order for refugees to share experi-
ences, as well as support to vulnerable groups and to detect protection 
and security matters.   
 
It was less clear, however, if the IDP sites have developed such com-
mittee structures. The IDP women we met in Goz Beida informed us 
that they take their cases to the local village chief if they have security 
concerns, who then can take the case to the DIS. Some of the UNCHR 
representatives in Abéché (6 November 2009) expressed a concern 
that there was a lack of strategic framework to work with SGBV cases 
in IDP sites. They argued that Darfuri refugees were way ahead of the 
host communities and IDPs in terms of understanding the problems of 
SGBV as a protection issue and a human rights violation, and not an 
acceptable cultural practice.  
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The Détachement Intégré de Sécurité and SGBV  
The DIS is in many ways unique in the UN history of peacekeeping. It 
is not only tasked with maintaining rule of law and security, but also 
building Chad's own community policing structure. Since neither the 
UN force nor the Chadian government have the capacity to secure the 
camps and sites 24-7, the DIS is in many ways fulfilling the mandate 
of protecting civilians. It is feared that the important work done on 
rule of law and protection of civilians achieved through the DIS will 
be lost with the withdrawal of MINURCAT. Further, the contextual 
challenges facing the DIS staff with armed attacks from banditry 
groups will be a major concern if they no longer receive back-up from 
MINURCAT (see i.e. IECAH report, 2010:12). Simply stated, if the 
DIS lacks security, it cannot be expected to maintain rule of law for 
refugees and IDPs.  
 
Throughout Chad we heard complaints from DIS staff that they had 
too much to do with car hijackings. In Farchana, they complained that 
many of these incidents happened because of the negligence of NGOs 
who refused to follow security instructions, travelling after the curfew, 
or (such as the ICRC) refusing to have an escort when driving close to 
100 km to visit a site (Farchana, 4. november 2009). The consequence 
of what DIS saw as recklessness of NGOs was of course that there 
was less time to attend to the security of the camps. NGOs expected to 
have them chase their stolen cars. In terms of training Chadian police, 
we were told that one of the main challenges for the UN was to recruit 
qualified trainers and mentors. As one of our interviewees told us, 
“The problem is that most countries who have qualified police don’t 
send them. They have a security situation in their own country to han-
dle” (interview with UN police, 3 November 2009). 
 
Together with the camp and site ‘committees’, the DIS is often one of 
the first receivers of SGBV cases involving IDPs and refugees. Based 
on the eyewitness accounts and interviews from the field visit, there 
appeared to be in general good relations and trust between the DIS and 
the IDPs and refugees in the sites and camps the team visited.9 In a 
recent report by Amnesty International (2009:23), they claimed that 
“the UN has reported a number of “serious cases of ill-discipline” in 
which DIS officers have been accused of violence that reportedly led 
to deaths or injuries of a number of civilians (…).” As this was neither 
the impression nor consistent with the evidence from the field data, we 
took a closer look at the reference used by Amnesty. The reference 
(UNSC 2009d: art. 33) showed that there were only four cases of seri-
ous misconduct in which all had been dismissed and in process of a 
                                                 
9  This is a view also supported by another independent research team from the IECAH 
(2010)  
Somewhere to Turn? MINURCAT and the Protection of Civilians in Eastern Chad and Darfur  17 
judicial follow-up. The quote “serious cases of ill-discipline” was 
simply taken out of its context.  
 
Nevertheless, from all the places we visited, similar arguments were 
made that the DIS’ capacity must be strengthened hand in hand with 
an improved judicial system. The judicial system, rather than miscon-
duct of DIS staff, was argued as a much deeper concern, according to 
several of our informants, as the DIS’ work against SGBV was being 
hampered by the lack of a functioning justice sector. In the Farchana 
camp, we were told that the judicial response to SGBV was the weak 
link in addressing SGBV, as domestic violence was generally ad-
dressed through traditional channels (interview in Farchana refugee 
camp, 4 November 2009). Some argued that improving the justice sec-
tor was seen as a threat and met with resistance by several official 
Chadian authorities at the provincial level. This can be linked to fear 
among officials of the parallel training and deployment of judicial 
staff supported by the international community. The judicial unit in 
MINURCAT has employed so-called mobile courts in key eastern lo-
cations in Chad in order for cases to be tried in more neutral and for-
mal systems. Within the traditional system, we were informed that 
there is no separation of power, and that the ‘sous-préfet’10 has more 
or less absolute power in the area. Hence, there are reasons to assume 
that such courts where challenging authorities in Chad, especially 
based on threats that staff in the mobile courts had received. The As-
sistant Secretary General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions at 
DPKO, Mr. Dimitry Titov, stated during his visit in Chad that it was 
important to follow up closely the work on building bridges between 
the mobile court systems and the traditional systems.11  
 
However, any substantial changes to the judicial system will inevita-
bly demand long-term commitment on the side of the international 
community, represented by MINURCAT and the development agen-
cies, and considerable resource allocations. Other issues are more 
general in kind. For instance, we were told of a certain “fear of jus-
tice” amongst refugee women. Some did not have access to justice as 
they feared to be discriminated if they were to face the Chadian judi-
cial system. Instead, they were left to seek recourse in familial and 
community settlements. These women were left in a juridical vacuum 
(“vide juridique”). Of course, the fact that the nearest court was 120 
km from Farchana did not make such recourse easier (Farchana refu-
gee camp, 4 November 2009). 
 
                                                 
10  The sous-préfet is an administrative authority appointed by a presidential decree and 
represents the state in a sub-prefecture.  
11  9 February 2009, reference found on MINURCAT webpage:  
http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=262&mid=533&ItemID=
1268  
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As MINURCAT’s stay in Chad is short-term and with a pure protec-
tion mandate not intended to fundamentally reform state structures, 
the traditional systems are perhaps the main entry point to work with 
governance. As some of the NGO representatives in Goz Beida ar-
gued; “one has to acknowledge the traditional system because it 
works” (3 November 2009). In another study (IECAH, 2010:15), 
where more than 200 people were interviewed, the majority of the 
Chadians interviewed preferred the traditional systems and felt that 
traditional leaders should be trained, arguably also since the mobile 
courts are limited. An important task within MINURCAT’s Rule of 
Law mandate was helping with the prosecution of SGBV crimes. Parts 
of this agenda included addressing SGBV through traditional courts 
and the Chadian justice system. These efforts, however, encountered 
problems, as the traditional justice system was often ill-understood 
(“traditional justice is complicated”) and as the safety necessary to 
administer justice was seldom in place. Justices of the Peace them-
selves, we were told, were not safe (interview with UN staff, 2 No-
vember 2009).  
 
Meeting with a DIS commissioner, we were also told of the problems 
experienced by DIS. While they acknowledged the importance of the 
help received from MINURCAT – especially the cars – a number of 
issues remained unresolved. Firstly, there was a lack of all-terrain ve-
hicles. Salaries were also an issue. Furthermore, they felt they should 
have received more medical training. They had no means to give first 
aid, as they lacked pharmacy kits. Other issues on the commissioner’s 
list were the lack of internet connection and showers. Also, their uni-
forms were too warm, and made them look like security guards, a po-
liceman told us. Not until they had proper combat gear would they be 
taken seriously, he complained. When asked about the security inside 
the camps, the DIS commissioner told us that the main concern was 
cattle theft. People in camps and sites, we were told, go out to steal 
cattle. While there had been a few cases of adultery and rape, few 
cases had been recorded recently. Domestic violence had been high 
between 2004 and 2007, we were told by the commissioner, but had 
since gone down. A problem the DIS encountered, however, was that 
while they generally felt well-equipped to address most security issues 
within the camps, they were not equipped to deal with the rebels.  
 
Another concern is that in the largely patriarchal society in Chad as 
well as Darfur where women are not allowed to talk to male strangers, 
the DIS has trouble in reaching the women. Hence, the female DIS 
staff is of crucial importance in terms of reaching the whole popula-
tion in the camps and sites. The relatively high percentage (almost 
15%) of women in the DIS is in many ways a success story. In inter-
views with UNPOL and DIS staff, the first five or so women that 
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started working for DIS became role models to attract more women to 
the force. Based on their experience, it has evidently become possible 
for women to both have a family and a job.    
 
Further, both UNHCR and the DIS expressed a concern for female 
victims of SGBV in the immediate 24-72 hours after an incident and 
subsequent reporting to the DIS station in the camp or site. The victim 
often feared reprisals at home and had in general several insecurity 
issues. As a result, DIS personnel in Guéréda had in many cases 
shared their house and food with some of these victims for shorter pe-
riods in order to provide for their security. They suggested that a sepa-
rate house should be built next to the DIS compound as a refuge for 
these victims. This view was also supported by UNHCR representa-
tives.  
 
Furthermore, as one of the DIS gender officers in Farchana noted (4 
November 2009), there are also considerable challenges in making 
refugees and IDPs aware and familiar with their legal rights. This was 
especially a concern since many of the women remain illiterate. As 
one UNHCR representative stated: “You can’t blame culture, but the 
lack of education. People are not aware of their legal rights.” Or in the 
words of the DIS gender officer in Farchana: “When women remain 
illiterate, it is difficult to change their situation, especially in terms of 
human rights.” Her suggestion for best practice was for the female 
DIS personnel to wear civilian clothes and talk to women when they 
were fetching water or in other traditional settings where men were 
absent. It would also beneficial since it would make talking to DIS 
personnel less conspicuous, and thus avoiding suspicions and reprisals 
from their communities. We were often reminded of the importance of 
having female police officers. In this way, they can enter into the “mi-
lieu des femmes”, we were told in Farchana. And women often prefer 
to come to other women with their problems. Hence, it became easier 
for women to open up and discuss their concerns in a low-key and in-
formal manner, as well as building trust between the DIS and the 
refugees and IDPs.  
 
In the Farchana camp, we spoke with the head of the DIS gender unit. 
“Rape has gone down dramatically,” she told us. She complained that 
women have many problems, but that most of them do not come out 
with their problems. This was exacerbated by the fact that women 
were often afraid of uniforms. The DIS gender unit therefore patrolled 
the camp in civilian and sat down with the women to chat: “The gen-
der unit must be in civilian outfit in order for women – who are al-
ready stigmatized – to feel safe.” Elaborating further, “women can’t 
stand the uniform”. Others, we were told, were wary about reporting 
cases of SGBV as they feared that their problems would worsen as a 
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consequence. Often, families do not want secrets to transpire to the 
authorities either. Many women neither want to denounce men, as it 
creates further problems for them. As women no longer come to the 
DIS station, she told us, DIS needed to go to them. One of the most 
important aspects of the work of the DIS gender unit, she insisted, was 
to sit down and talk with the women. Most of the women in the camps 
struggle with a “problème de pesanteur” – the weight of every day life 
in the camps. Women felt a “pesanteur socio-culturelle” which came 
out only when female DIS officers sat down with them. Only then did 
they open up. They often did not want to press charges as they felt this 
would only exacerbate their difficulties. DIS did not press them to do 
so either: “We are not here to divide the refugees; we are here to help 
them live a better life.” Intervening too strongly on one side could also 
potentially lead to difficulties. We were told of an episode where DIS 
personnel were met with the requirement to reimburse a dowry if they 
wanted to meddle. On the importance of female officers again: in a 
camp nearby Farchana, “there was one case where a chef de poste did 
not let the female DIS representative take the deposition of a woman, 
but took it himself. He is a man who doesn’t really know gender prob-
lematique, and had already judged the woman beforehand”. 
No Place for Women in the Camps? 
Compared to a number of more high-profiled areas of international 
intervention (e.g. Afghanistan, Haiti, DR Congo and Darfur), there are 
far fewer international NGOs present and weaker civil society struc-
tures in Chad. As the Lonely Planet guide puts it for visitors to Chad: 
“Even many NGO workers dread drawing this assignment.”12 Thus, 
there is a strong wish among the operational staff in Chad for advo-
cacy groups such as Amnesty to attune the international community to 
the situation in the country and its regional position. However, 
throughout our field visit from 2 to 10 November 2009, the Amnesty 
report (2009) was being criticized from a wide range of international 
staff present in Chad, both for its methodological and factual flaws.  
 
The picture painted by the Amnesty report is one where rape is a mas-
sive problem throughout refugee camps, in an extremely insecure en-
vironment. The report is also highly critical of the UN efforts, espe-
cially MINURCAT. However, many of the supporting quotes in the 
report are simply wrong, taken out of their context, or even distorted 
versions of UN documents. A case in point is a quote on page 23 high-
lighting the “serious problems” associated with DIS. The quote is 
taken from a Report of the UN Secretary-General, dated 14 July 2009, 
which highlights the positive contribution of DIS.  
 
                                                 
12  Article downloaded September 9, 2010 at http://www.lonelyplanet.com/chad   
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The Amnesty report’s exaggeration of problems, number of cases in-
volved and collateral damage seriously undermines the reliability of 
Amnesty’s advocacy work. It also goes to show the difficulty involved 
in making an exact assessment of the security situation in conflict ar-
eas. Relying on reports from advocacy groups can – as in the present 
case – be misleading at best. The quote referred to above and its pri-
mary sources are easy to check, however, it is much more difficult to 
verify the anonymous responses from refugees, actual composition of 
the refugees (age, sex, origin etc), and the number of interview sub-
jects and in what situations. For good reasons, these responses should 
remain anonymous. But refugee camps are often a hotbed of rumours 
and it is important to check replies with UN and civil society staff 
working in the camps, and with other documentation if available. 
From our field visit to several of these camps, the first statement when 
refugee women were asked about their difficulties, the problem of 
rape or “SGBV” (a term used by many of the long-term displaced) 
that comes up. However, when going deeper into issues affecting eve-
ryday life and people’s well-being, it is the holistic picture relating to 
the issue of livelihoods and conflicts over scarce resources like water, 
firewood and food that poses the greatest challenges. When speaking 
with leaders in the Gouroukoun IDP camp (3 November 2009), we 
were informed that the main concern of the displaced was food. They 
had too little land to cultivate, and no security when going out of the 
camp to work in fields further away. The provision of aid by NGOs 
was not seen as a viable solution either, as their mandate was of a 
temporary character only. Other concerns were employment and lack 
of activities in the camps. In the Djabal camp, we were faced with a 
series of complaints: lack of water, lack of food, lack of variation in 
the rations, lack of medical treatment. We also heard complaints about 
the lack of meat in the diet. No meat in the UN sanctioned rations 
meant that a family had to buy meat on the market. In order to do this, 
one either had to sell off part of one’s ration, or fetch firewood to sell 
on the market. The result, either way, was to the detriment of single 
women who could not safely leave the camps, or putting women at 
risk since they had to go outside to fetch firewood (interview in Djabal 
refugee camp, 3 November 2009). 
 
The future of refugees after a possible return home was also high on 
the agenda. Many feared they would be unprepared. A concern that 
seemed to be shared in many camps was the lack of education. As we 
were told in the Djabal camp, while the refugees had fled war, warlike 
conditions had now caught up with them in the form of illiteracy. 
They wanted education in order to know their rights (interview in 
Djabal refugee camp, 3 November 2009). This concern was also reit-
erated in the Koloma IDP site. As a case in point, children who obtain 
school diplomas in camps can make no use of them, as they are unable 
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to continue their studies outside the camps (Interviews in Djabal refu-
gee camp, 3 November 2009). When talking to refugees in the camps, 
we often noticed a sense of resignation and general unease that were 
difficult to define. When we asked representatives about daily life in 
the camps, the answer  was often that the problems in the camps were 
nothing compared to their homesickness: “To leave one’s own country 
and settle in another is very hard.” Life in the camps consisted in a lot 
of dead periods, we were told. A lot of waiting without any activity – 
income-generating or otherwise. Being a refugee entails a lot of suf-
fering, not least the loss of dignity (Interviews in Djabal refugee 
camp, 3 November  2009).  
 
Throughout our visits in both camps and sites, we were made aware of 
the difference between refugees and internally displaced people. 
Though a UNICEF representative assured us that in terms of protec-
tion there was no difference, we were told how refugees on the whole 
had more resources. Children in refugee camps received yellow t-
shirts to play basketball, we were told. Children in IDP sites did not. 
Schools, too, were much worse in the IDP sites than in the refugee 
camps. And while these examples may seem trivial to the observer 
when talking about people who are in need of protection from the 
atrocities of war, they do seem to matter a great deal to people living 
through the endless monotony of camps.  
 
Camps also suffered from repeated fires. Lack of water and firewood 
made building houses of bricks difficult, leaving the straw huts vul-
nerable to rapidly spreading fires. More mundane conflicts, constraints 
and frustration about the daily life in camps may in turn lead to in-
creased cases of SGBV and domestic violence and violence commit-
ted by the host community. In the cases documented by UNHCR (ref. 
internal document dated 30 September 2009), the perpetrators outside 
the camp were often Chadians, while refugees themselves were often 
the perpetrators of SGBV inside the camps. In other words, documen-
tation for claiming it to be a weapon of war utilized by Janjaweed in 
eastern Chad is hard to find. UNPOL officers gave us a nuanced pic-
ture of the situation. In many cases of SGBV, the perpetrator was 
known, but his identity could not be divulged. In such cases, we were 
told, “Arab bandits” were blamed. Furthermore, the problems that 
dominate the statistics on SGBV are cultural practices related to early 
marriages, female genital mutilation (FGM) and various forms of do-
mestic violence, rather than rape. Relevant approaches to harmful 
practices should run along the lines of sensitization programmes, fa-
cilitating dialogue and discussion groups. The SGBV committee (10 
women and one man) in the Mile camp in eastern Chad told us that 
rape seems in particular to be a problem when women were outside 
the camps. But as one woman told us, “SGBV is not only rape, but a 
Somewhere to Turn? MINURCAT and the Protection of Civilians in Eastern Chad and Darfur  23 
number of our own customs are SGBV problems, i.e. forced marriage 
and female genital mutilation (FGM).” In the Mile camp, SGBV focal 
points were alerted if an incident happened, and oriented women to-
wards medical services. Another woman we spoke with, told us that 
“FGM had been reduced due to the sensitization measures carried out 
by the NGOs. Because FGM is not a religious matter, but a matter of 
tradition and custom”. And the same applies to forced marriage, where 
women are the victims: “If a woman refuses [a forced marriage] she 
can be tied up and forced to accept the man” (Mile Camp SGBV 
Committee, 5 November 2009). 
Final Remarks 
In the present report, we have described the need for robust peace-
keeping mandates which can secure the protection of vulnerable 
groups in conflict environments. Unlike other reports on the topic, we 
have argued that the contribution of MINURCAT – on the whole – 
albeit different from its predecessor EUFOR, was good. The safety of 
both refugees and IDPs had been addressed to the point where many 
of those we interviewed did not see it as their primary concern any-
more. 
 
But while the safety of camps and sites seemed on the whole to have 
been addressed, it goes without saying that incidents persisted – some 
grave and others less so. The ability of DIS to address them, especially 
cases of SGBV, had been put to the test. As we have sought to show, 
while some cases had been handled rather well, challenges remained, 
especially in terms of implementing a community policing approach 
to all the camps. For this to be realized, more resources and training 
would be needed. At the same time, we also witnessed some stellar 
examples of how policies to address SGBV had been implemented. 
DIS had made a serious contribution to the security both inside and 
outside of camps at the time of our fieldwork. One of the reasons why 
SGBV has remained so high on the international agenda may be the 
fact that the international community has been much concerned with 
it. A UNPOL officer also complained to us that “the problem is that 
high-level delegations arrive here and ask about SGBV, and you tell 
them: ‘sorry, it’s not happening; the problem here is administration of 
justice’. But that’s not as sexy. SGBV gets all the attention.”  
 
That being said, we have highlighted some examples worth building 
on, both in training curricula and in policy development. The impor-
tance of police officers trained in SGBV matters, and patrolling the 
communities in civilian outfit and connecting with women in the 
camps is one of these. For while the effects of this work may be diffi-
cult to trace, there are some examples of success. Firewood distribu-
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tion programmes, the DIS community patrolling in Farchana, and the 
SGBV awareness among refugees in some of the camps all constitute 
such examples. 
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